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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In the last twenty years, the issue of the autonomy of the northern regions has always 
been on the Italian political agenda, even if with ups and downs. The traditional 
“Southern Question” has been supplanted in the public debate by the so-called “Northern 
Question”. Its appearance and achievement were promoted by three processes. 
The first, typically Italian, concerns the crisis of the First Republic and, above all, 
the dissolution of the main mass parties (DC, PCI, and PSI) which had guaranteed for 
many years the stability of national political representation, while keeping at the same 
time close relationships with the local communities. The second process, the current 
phase of globalization subsequent to the end of the Cold War, caused many economic and 
social problems in Italy, as in the other European countries, and had a very specific 
impact on the North of Italy, with its diffused economy and urbanization characterized by 
industrial districts and their systems of flexible specialization (Cento Bull and Gilbert, 
2001; Cento Bull in this volume). The third process, strictly interlaced with the second, is 
the strong increase of migratory flows from countries of the ex-soviet block and from 
other continents: their swiftness and intensity caused disorientation, anxieties and fears 
among Italians, since they were historically more accustomed to emigration and little 
prepared to face the increasing processes of immigration. 
The effects of these dynamics created some favourable but not sufficient 
conditions for the appearance of the “Northern Question”. It would have hardly emerged 
without the success of a political party – the Lega Nord – that built its own identity on the 
opposition between the northern regions and the national government. Still, the 
relationship between the party founded by Umberto Bossi and the so-called “Northern 
Question” is really complex and can be understood according to very different 
interpretative keys. We can read it in accordance with a determinist key, by considering 
the Lega Nord as a consequence of the Northern Question. Even if this party had not 
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existed, other northern movements would have been born in answer to problems, needs, 
and the deficit of representation which characterizes society in many areas of the North of  
Italy. A nominalist interpretation, on the opposite, reduces the Northern Question and the 
northern movement to a skilful propagandistic invention to manage a large variety of 
interests, the only ones considered important and concrete by the political actor and its 
electors. The idea of “Padania”, in this view, has no real foundation, and the electoral 
success of Lega Nord stands for something else: the complaint against parties, the middle 
classes’ tax rebellion, the needs of the ideal “North-eastern entrepreneur”, the 
inefficiency of public services, the demand for regional decentralization. 
The two opposite perspectives seize some aspects of the relationship existing 
between the Lega Nord and the Northern Question, and can provide some significant 
cognitive contributions. Nevertheless, both consider the political process as irrelevant, 
and deem the dynamics of creation of a public problem as epiphenomenal, by-products of 
structural evolutions without autonomy. Besides being criticizable on a theoretical plan, 
because indifferent to the generative character of political action (McAdam, Tarrow and 
Tilly, 2001), the determinist and the nominalist approaches, in the end, are unable to 
explain the whole of factors and actions that led to the appearance of the Northern 
Question. 
In this chapter we therefore are proposing a different option, of the constructive 
type. The main idea is that the growing importance of the Northern Question within the 
political debate and the collective imagination could be explained by relating the 
subjective political initiative of the Lega with the conditions and replies of the political, 
economic and social world. In this sense, our theoretical option follows recent 
developments of the aptly defined “Contextual Policy Analysis” (Goodin and Tilly, 2006) 
that aims to explain political processes by observing how pertinent actors behave in some 
contexts structured by cultural and value constraints, by institutions and their respective 
prescriptive and operational instruments, by environments made up of opportunities and 
economic interests. In this sense, what we call a constructive approach is very similar to 
that sort of studies of the political process which we often refer to, even according to 
pragmatic sensitivity (Cefaï and Pasquier, 2004; Cantelli et al., 2009). This approach is 
based on the theoretic conviction that a certain degree of autonomy and inventiveness of 
political action, even if bound by the context it is placed in, would make a difference and 
should be taken into account to obtain reliable explanations of the configurations of 
power and the dynamics of public opinion (Boltanski and Claverie, 2007). 
 
 
2. THE WEAKNESS OF ITALIAN REGIONALISM AND THE FRACTURE 
NORTH/SOUTH 
 
The issues of regional autonomy and federalism have never had great political relevance 
in Italy, at least until the eighties. The process of building the unitary state had taken a 
shape “at the same time so feeble to turn out largely inefficacious and so strong to 
multiply the opposing reaction of the country and to reinforce the secular particularistic 
feelings” (Romanelli, 1991:714). The persistency of parochialism and particularism and 
the differences of the local sub-cultures did not give rise to claims for regional autonomy 
and did not provoke conflicts capable to question national unity. Localist type trends are 
not usually characterized by the opposition to the state-nation dimension, but by the 
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extraneousness and lack of interest for politics: those who share these trends refer almost 
exclusively to the limited horizon of the local communities (Merton, 1949:725). Local 
sub-cultures very often coexist with the prevailing culture on a national scale, without 
developing significant oppositions. In Italy, localism had expressed itself within the 
different subcultures and local political traditions (Bagnasco and Oberti, 1998). From the 
Second World War until the end of the Cold War, the local sub-cultures have been 
integrated by the most important political cultures on a national scale (Biorcio, 2003). 
The mediation of interests on a territorial scale had been guaranteed during the first forty 
years of the Republic, both by single parties’ inner mechanisms (with the co-optation of 
regional élites and the aimed redistribution of resources), and through a geographic 
division of tasks among the most important parties that, due to their privileged 
relationships with some territorial areas, were perceived as spokespersons for their 
interests and values. In this sense, the main mass parties had guaranteed for many years a 
sort of institutionalization of the management of the centre-periphery fracture in the 
framework of the Italian state, with an administration characterized by a longstanding 
tradition of absolutism and centralism. 
The distribution of economic recourses between the different territorial areas did 
not cause noteworthy protests in the regions of northern Italy until the eighties. After the 
creation of the nation state, the economic and social fracture between North and South 
was deep, but the absence of strong ethno-cultural differences allowed the political 
system to support an alliance between the economic interests of the two areas, making 
territorial mobilization difficult (Trigilia, 1984:82). During the second post-war period, 
even though the economic difference between the North and the South was reduced, an 
autonomous productive system did not develop in the southern regions (Mingione, 1991). 
In the speech of the main Italian parties, the Southern Question was represented as a 
national matter: problems of economic development and social modernization of southern 
regions were shown as priority commitments for the whole national community. 
The institution of “Regions with ordinary statute” in 1970 did not promote 
regionalist trends. Only in those regions with a strong linguistic and cultural autonomy 
(Valle d’Aosta, South Tyrol, Sardinia, regions with an extraordinary statute) autonomist 
parties were able to obtain a considerable electoral following. The ethno-cultural 
distinctions between the northern regions and the other Italian regions were really limited 
and there were no linguistic gap or religious differences to support more or less 
spontaneous mobilizations. 
During the second half of the eighties, the rising tax pressure and the high costs of 
financing public debt were creating increasing problems for the economy of northern 
Italy and the well-being of its population. In years of high inflation and of halving of the 
Gross Domestic Product growth rate (relative to the two previous decades), the intense 
and sometimes dramatic post-Fordist transition had created an economic context in which 
the traditional defence of southern interests lost legitimacy. In a context of strongly 
increasing patronage, mass parties were not able to offer a coherent reformulation of the 
problems of the South of Italy, and started losing their strategic and selective ability to 
represent organized interests. The Southern Question increasingly lost its credibility, 
reducing itself to a matter of simple redistribution of resources, often from a political 
viewpoint (Cantaro, 1990). The loss of an adequate cultural reference dragged with it a 
crisis of legitimacy of the political instruments to support the South of Italy and, shortly 
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afterwards, of the very possibility to consider the Southern Question as a matter of 
general interest (Huysseune, 2006: ch. 4) 
Nevertheless, it was not just a loss of legitimacy of the South of Italy that created 
the conditions for the rising of the Northern Question. In the same period, in fact, another 
very significant trend was registered: the weakening of the mass parties’ power of 
territorial interest mediation, invested by the effects of the end of the Cold War and by 
the crisis of the two main political sub-cultures. The relationship between Italian regions 
and national institutions radically changed during the nineties after the unexpected 
emergence of Lega Nord. Federalism and the Northern Question attained such an 
importance that they strongly affected Italian politics during the following stages. 
 
 
3. REGIONALIST POPULISM AND THE INVENTION OF PADANIA  
 
The researches on the formation and the first successes of the Lega Nord have 
analytically reconstructed the process of development of the new political subject, by 
dividing it in different stages, considering both the changes in its proposals, and the 
transformation in the distribution of electoral support in relation with territorial contexts 
and political and social positions.1 In order to study in a longer period the transformations 
of the party led by Umberto Bossi and its interaction with the Italian political system, 
today a different periodization can be more suitable, by considering firstly the alternation 
that was registered between stages of high electoral growth and stages of decline and 
stagnation of support. The simple inspection of the vote percentage obtained by the Lega 
Nord during the European and national elections between 1983 and 2009 allows singling 
out three waves of electoral successes, spaced out so far by two stages of relative decline 
(see Figure 1). The three waves developed in a context of different social and political 
opportunities that the Lega Nord could efficaciously manage. 
In the eighties the regional leagues created in Piedmont, Lombardy and Veneto 
had only played a secondary role. They were small formations that re-proposed in Italy 
the fundamental ideas of regionalist movements: the defence of traditions and culture 
existing in specific territorial contexts together with a request of decentralization of 
political power and the promotion of local self-government. For many years, the 
outcomes of the autonomist leagues were disappointing (see Figure 1). 
The qualitative leap happened in Lombardy in 1989 when the party founded by 
Umberto Bossi became the fourth party within the richest and most populated region in 
Italy with 470.997 votes (8,1%). The original political proposal of the autonomist leagues 
was deeply modified. Under the direction of Bossi, the ethno-regionalist protest was 
turned into a popular battle against roman party-power. The North was, in the speech of 
the Lega Nord leader, an “economic giant and a political dwarf”. The autonomy of all the 
Italian northern regions was presented as the more radical way to get rid of the power of 
traditional parties and state bureaucracy. The polarization Lombardy/Rome symbolized in 
a very effective way the existing tensions between civil society and the party system and 
provided citizens with a concrete point of reference for collective identification (Diani, 
1996).  
                                                 
1
 See Diamanti, 1993:16-19; Rovati and Mazzette, 1993: 25; De Luna, 1994:43-52; 
Biorcio, 1997:35-38: for a recent re-reading see Biorcio, 2010. 
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Far from just being an emerging phenomenon, the Northern Question was 
“invented” by the Lega and embedded in a well-defined frame: that of the dispute of the 
labouring North against an inefficient, inefficacious and ineffective (good-for-nothing) 
political centre.2 The exaltation of values such as the laboriousness and efficiency of 
Lombard people in contrast with the shortages of the bureaucratic machinery, gave the 
Lega vote a general meaning of rebellion and of affirmation of the weight of a healthy 
civil society against the political class. This presentation of its political offer drew its 
strength from long period structured modalities to conceive the relationship between civil 
society and political representation in Lombardy: here, the tendency to perceive the 
productive abilities and the solidarity of civil society in contrast with an extraneous and 
mediocre political power has always been diffused (Biorcio, 2001). The regionalist 
identity became a point of reference to express a whole set of tensions experienced by 
some classes of the population: tensions between citizens and the political class, between 
natives and immigrants (southern people before, and “non-Europeans” later), between 
common people and the different forms of criminality and deviance (Biorcio and 
Mannheimer, 1995). The Lega Lombarda thus managed to establish a mass following by 
proposing a combination of regionalism and populist dissent (Biorcio, 1991). 
Umberto Bossi’s party proposed an appeal intended both as demos (people as a 
whole and at the same time the common people, the mob, the popular masses in 
opposition to the élites), and as ethnos (people as ethno-national entity). The efficacious 
                                                 
2
 On the most recent developments of the frame analysis for the study of political 
processes, cf. Cefaï & Trom, 2000; Snow, 2004; Barisione, 2009. 
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management of this formula was the basis of the successes of all the European populist 
movements and parties of the last twenty years because it connected the pole of popular 
protest with that of identity (Mény and Surel, 2000:187; Taguieff, 2002:57). This mixture 
of populism and regionalism impressed a very defined brand on the formulation of the 
Northern Question in Italy, since it not only implies a demand for self-government, but 
also as open opposition and challenge to national parties, censured as corrupted because 
of their centralism and consequently “Southern-ness”. 
The electoral success of Lega Lombarda dragged also that of other regional 
leagues that converged in the Lega Nord. In 1992 the expansion in all the northern 
regions did not significantly change the general characteristics of the Lega electorate 
compared with those of the first electorate of Lega Lombarda (cf. table 1). The social 
profile remained interclass, with a particularly accentuated penetration within the 
traditional lower middle class (traders, craftsmen, independent farmers) (Mannheimer, 
1993:256). As for the social composition, the Lega electorate profile was very similar to 
the traditional Christian Democrat one. Then again, the deepest infiltration of the new 
party took place, in fact, within the areas long ruled by the Catholic party, while the 
diffusion of votes for the Lega was much more reduced within the “red areas”. 
 
TAB. 1. Vote for Northern League by Professional Condition (1991-2008) 
Occupation 1991 1994 1996 2001 2006 2008 
Businessmen-Prof-Managers    14 15,8 12,4 12 4,4 13,5 
Employee Teacher 13,3 16 18,8 10,1 8,2 10,9 
Traders-Shopkeepers-Craftsmen-
Farmers  24 26,5 23,9 7,6 16,8 21,7 
Blue Collar Worker 16,6 21,4 31,2 10,7 9,2 19,8 
Unemployed 11,2 14,2 17,3 5,9 8,1 15,5 
Northern Italy 14,1 16,9 19,8 8,2 8,5 17,2 
Sources: Eurisko, Cirm, Abacus, Doxa Pools – Northern ItalianRegions  
 
Some characteristics of territorial contexts particularly influenced the diffusion of 
the vote for the Lega. In short, the percentage of votes for the Lega reached very high 
levels above all in three types of zones: a) areas where the catholic sub-culture was more 
deeply-rooted; b) small villages, in particular those far from big cities; c) areas marked 
out by small enterprises systems that in some cases had taken the profile of real industrial 
district, and that in other cases remained local production systems that were nevertheless 
capable of flexible specialization. 
In Italy, the Lega Nord had an essential role in starting up and characterize the so-
called “anti-politics cycle” (Mastropaolo, 2000; Marletti, 2002; Mete, 2010) which 
strongly contributed to provoke the crisis of the Italian party-system between 1992 and 
1993. Berlusconi’s entering the field in 1994 stole from the Lega the representation of the 
middle class and of the opposition to the post-communist left, and grabbed a large part of 
its electoral consensus. Therefore, the Lega abandoned federalism as a political project in 
favour of an independence movement, with a mobilization for the construction of the 
“Padanian nation”. By attacking both right-wing and left-wing parties, the Lega managed 
to maintain a faithful electorate in many provinces and in 1996 it became the first party in 
the northern Italian regions (Agnew et al., 2002). 
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If during the first wave of its electoral successes the Lega Nord had assumed as 
privileged reference the crisis of the Italian party-system, afterwards the projects and 
initiatives of the “movement” referred primarily to the crisis of the nation-state. The Lega 
Nord, during this phase, invested above all in identity-making initiatives, culminating in 
the “march on the Po” and the election of the “parliament of Padania”. Of course, it 
continued its polemic against the government and party-power, as well as the 
management of hostility against new immigrants (no longer Southerners, but “non-
Europeans”) even if the migratory phenomenon had not reached the present levels. 
This second wave was characterized also by a transfer of its reference social basis. 
The first “anti-partyist” Lega had more success among the lower middle classes and the 
northern small entrepreneurs. During the second secessionist wave, workers, most of all, 
voted for the Lega Nord (see table 1). In 1996 the Lega collected nearly a third of the 
votes among workers residing in the northern regions of Italy (31%). These votes came 
above all from small and medium firm workers, those somehow more exposed to 
competition and where the identification of workers with the interests of the firms they 
are engaged by, is much easier. In these industries, workers attribute more importance to 
the dangers of international competition than to those of class relations within the firm. 
Analysis shows that votes came also from a lot of trade unions members, even 
from the CGIL (the left-wing trade union). Dissociation occurred between the 
representation of economic interests strictly speaking, and the political and “identity-
making” representation: workers went on relying on traditional trade-unions (CGIL, 
CISL and UIL) for the defence of their economic interests, in fact, Lega unions never had 
a great success. As for their political representation, on the contrary, the reference of 
Bossi’s party to the local/regional community seemed to intercept better the emerging 
“desire for community” within contemporary society discussed by Bauman (2001). 
Besides, during those years, the left-wing experienced an increasing crisis of its capacity 
to propose efficacious politics to local communities, and the tensions and fears present in 
them (Centemeri, 2011). 
The disorientation of many social sectors in the context of globalization was 
beginning to be perceived (Beirich and Woods, 2000) and the basic idea the Lega Nord 
proposed was that only by closing in the local/regional community, it would be possible 
to secure it from the dangers of neo-liberal globalization (Huysseune, 2006:184-185). 
This way, it is possible to explain the insistence on separatist projects and at the same 
time on the policies of international institutions, and the idea of introducing protective 
duties against Chinese competition. After 1998, the Lega Nord’s criticisms against the 
construction of the European Union also increased. 
The separatist turning point was a strategic choice, the outcome of a reflective 
elaboration in connection with the difficult fulfilment of the federalist project because of 
the impossibility to arouse autonomist movements in the Centre and in the South 
(Biorcio, 1997). The separatism of Lega Nord is distinguishable from the historical 
separatist and nationalist movements by two essential elements. These movements 
impose themselves beginning from a clear form of ethno-cultural differentiation 
(linguistic or religious) and involve at least part of the national élites (Cirulli, 2005). The 
Lega Nord could not rely upon such resources. The project of secession of the Padania 
did not involve the economic, financial, industrial and intellectual élites of the North. The 
party has on the contrary always run an explicit polemic against the élites of the North, by 
accentuating and displaying its own populist or “common people” character, by 
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simplifying its political language at the most and by introducing in politics expressions 
typical of the masses (Dematteo, 2007). In the second half of the nineties, then, the few 
intellectuals that joined the movement in the first growing phase abandoned it, while the 
electorate of Lega has become more and more popular. 
After 1996, the radicalization of the separatist position had accentuated the 
isolation of the Lega, reducing its weight in Italian politics. The consensus gained could 
not be translated in a significant acquisition of political and institutional power. After the 
disappointing outcome of the European elections of 1999, Bossi stipulated a new 
coalition with Berlusconi. The Northern Question was tactically redefined, by linking the 
possibility of reinforcement of the regional autonomies to the conquest of the national 
government; the fight against Roman centralism, a frame on which the Lega Nord had so 
much invested, was articulated and partly re-represented in relation to the battle of Forza 
Italia against “statism”, i.e. against the intervention of the state in economics considered 
pervasive and paralyzing (Biorcio, 2000:261). The axis Lega Nord-Forza Italia was 
accredited to the militants of Lega as a sort of alliance for the productive North, 
strengthened by the common Lombard origin of the two political formations. In other 
words, the coalition was presented as a political way to solve the Northern Question. 
The centre-right wing won the political elections in 2001, but the Lega Nord 
weakened (8,1% out of the votes in the northern regions, 3,9% on a national scale) (see 
Figure 1). Bossi lost support among the most radical electors, while other electoral areas 
that had voted for the Lega in the past, were attracted by Berlusconi and his party 
(Cavatorta, 2001). 
 
 
3. THE POLITICIZATION OF SENTIMENTS OF TERRITORIAL BELONGING 
 
The Lega Nord has largely used sentiments of territorial belonging to give a basis to its 
project of autonomy of the northern regions. This policy, typical of all ethno-regionalist 
movements, had already been followed by the autonomist leagues of the eighties. 
Sentiments of territorial belonging assume deeply different meanings according to the 
dimensions of the territory and the reference population. The local context is specific and 
peculiar, characterized by the possibility for anyone to socially interact with the majority 
of the others. The sociological profile of other contexts such as regions and larger 
territorial areas is, on the contrary, much more different, as they can originate specific 
forms of identification or collective belonging. In this case, references are made to an 
area and a populace that cannot be the object of direct and personal experience. These 
contexts can only become the referent of specific forms of collective identification by 
using symbols and cultural elaborations. The problem, from this point of view, appears 
substantially similar to that of the creation of sentiments of national belonging which 
refer to an “imagined community”, the projection in a larger context of communitarian 
identities existing in a local context3. Even the regional communities and the North, 
                                                 
3
 According to the famous definition of Benedict Anderson, the nation is fundamentally a 
mental representation, “a political imagined community – and imagined as intrinsically 
limited and supreme. It is imagined because the members of a nation, even the smallest, 
never know the majority of their fellow-citizens, nor they ever hear of them, and, 
nevertheless, the image of their communion lives in everyone’s mind” (Anderson, 2006).  
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central referents for the Lega political identity, belong to the category of imagined 
communities. They were built and assumed meaning and significance thanks to the action 
of specific political actors that understood the importance and urgency of investing on the 
relationship between identity and representation. 
The attempts of the autonomist leagues to create a movement and to obtain 
consensus around sentiments of regionalist belongings were frustrated at first. In the 
beginning of the nineties just a sixth of the northern Italy residents indicated those 
sentiments of belongings as primary reference (see table 2). Sentiments of local 
(municipalities) and national community belonging were much more diffused. The main 
differences between the North and the South appear above all for the sentiments of 
belonging to the local context (much more diffused in the South of Italy) and for those 
concerning Italy (much more diffused in the North). In 1990 there were no signs of 
reinforcement of sentiments of regionalist belonging, nor a significant potential growth of 
the fracture centre/periphery. In all the Italian regions, sentiments of territorial belonging 
– local, regional and national – coexisted and overlapped with different intensity, without 
excluding each other (Segatti, 1995:109). The overwhelming majority of the Italians 
recognized themselves at the same time in the local or regional context as well as in the 
national one (ibidem:137). 
The break-through of the Lega Nord was possible, as shown, thanks to the 
combination of the original ethno-regionalism with the populist protest against national 
parties. The claim for regional autonomy was changed into a popular battle against the 
Roman party-power. After the first electoral successes of the Lega Lombarda and the 
Lega Nord, the party proposals began to be known to the public and to assume meaning 
for the electorate. The voters of Lega presented an identity-making profile completely 
different from the other voters because they more frequently pointed out a greater feeling 
of regional belonging. The Lega Nord had progressively built up and promoted a well-
defined interpretative outline for the Northern Question: the protest of an industrious 
North against an inefficient and parasitic political Centre that distributed resources in the 
southern regions to cultivate clienteles and to gain electoral support. 
During the following years, the difficulties of realizing the federalist project due 
to the impossibility to mobilize autonomist movements in the regions of the Centre and 
the South, promoted the Lega separatist turning point. The idea of the regions/nations was 
progressively replaced by that of Padania. Appealing to the grudge against the cultural 
and political “colonization” and the “robbery” of resources by Rome and the Southerners, 
the political initiative of the Lega tried to operate a fusion of sentiments of both local and 
regional belonging with the belonging to a new imaginary community with larger 
borders: Padania or more simply the “North”. 
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TAB. 2. Sentiment of territorial belonging and electoral preference (1990, 2001 and 2006) (%) 
 ALL GEOGRAFIC ZONE 
VOTE IN NORTHERN 
REGIONS DIFFERENCE 
   North Centre South Lega 
Centre-
right 
Centre-
left 
Other-
NR 
North-
South 
Lega-
Nord 
Main 
identification           
1990           
Municipality 
where I live 36,0 26,8 46,0 43,6 26,5 26,7 30,8 24,4 -16,8 -0,3 
Region where 
I live 13,3 15,9 8,5 12,4 37,6 17,3 12,0 13,1 3,5 21,7 
Italy 36,0 43,6 36,1 24,5 27,1 47,2 46,4 43,5 19,1 -16,5 
Europe/world 13,7 12,2 8,9 19,0 8,8 7,6 10,8 16,2 -6,8 -3,4 
NR 1,0 1,5 0,5 0,5 0,0 1,3 0,0 2,8 1,0 -1,5 
TOTAL 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 0,0 0,0 
2001           
Municipality 
where I live 30,3 29,2 26,9 33,7 27,3 32,5 23,8 31,1 -4,5 -1,9 
Region where 
I live 11,0 11,5 6,4 13,2 30,7 9,8 10,7 11,8 -1,7 19,2 
Italy 35,5 35,7 40,9 32,2 30,6 38,9 35,8 32,3 3,5 -5,1 
Europe/world 21,7 22,2 24,7 19,3 11,4 17,7 28,9 22,4 2,9 -10,8 
NR 1,4 1,4 1,2 1,6 0,0 1,2 0,8 2,5 -0,2 -1,4 
TOTAL 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 0,0 0,0 
2006           
Municipality 
where I live 27,6 27,7 21,8 30,6 29,8 32,5 24,5 26,8 -2,9 2,1 
Region where 
I live 13,0 13,3 7,1 15,8 31,0 12,5 11,1 13,9 -2,5 17,7 
Italy 35,5 35,1 42,4 32,3 26,4 38,2 34,5 34,3 2,8 -8,7 
Europe/world 21,8 22,6 26,5 18,2 12,8 16,6 29,6 21,8 4,4 -9,8 
NR 2,1 1,2 2,2 3,1 0,0 0,3 0,2 3,2 -1,9 -1,2 
TOTAL 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 0,0 0,0 
 
Which were the effects of the political campaigns promoted by the Lega on 
sentiments of territorial belonging? Two researches carried out in 2001 and 2006 
demonstrate that no great changes occurred. In general, we registered a diminution of 
localist identification, but the differences between the North and the South did not 
increase. Sentiments of regionalist and localist belonging in northern Italy turned out to 
be relatively less diffused than in the southern regions (see table 2). Of course, the Lega 
voters were different because they shared to a greater extent the regional identification 
and acknowledged the Lega’s role of expressing a particular territorial identification 
(Cavazza and Corbetta, 2008). On the other hand, in 1998 we could already point out 
how the Lega voters tended to separate local from national identification, unlike all the 
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other northern citizens (Biorcio, 1999:69). The researches carried out in the last ten years 
prove how sentiments of belonging to Europe or to the entire world are much more 
diffused among citizens of the North of Italy compared with the national average. Among 
the electors of Lega, transnational belongings dropped at a definitely lower level than that 
registered in the southern regions. 
Even if the Lega Nord abandoned the idea of secession, and Padania stayed an 
administrative entity with unclear borders, the weight of the Northern Question does not 
seem to diminish within public opinion. In fact, we have pointed out an increasing 
tendency in some parts of the population to acknowledge some importance to sentiments 
of belonging to northern Italy (or to the North), beyond the specific localist or regionalist 
belongings. It deals with an attitude that refers not only to the cultural and economic 
differences between the North and the South, but points out also other themes and 
contents. In 1996 belonging to northern Italy was recognized as a priority by about 5,3% 
of the interviewees on a national scale, and by more than a tenth of the residents of the 
northern regions (11%). The diffusion of this type of belonging has increased in the 
following years, above all in the last years, parallel with the electoral outcomes of the 
Lega Nord. In 2000 belonging to the North was declared by 9,3% of the interviewees on 
a national scale4 and this increased up to 13,9 % in 2005, 18,1 % in 2006, reaching 22,7 
% in 2008.5 This attitude does not only reflect a territorial belonging: belonging to the 
North is also acknowledged by some residents of other regions. The reference to the 
North includes at the same time a common belonging and a series of problems and 
contents that were associated to it in the campaigns promoted by the Lega Nord. This 
attitude is naturally largely spread within the Lega electorate, but it is also shared by 
some sectors of the electorate of centre-right parties resident in the North, more tuned 
with the proposals and the propaganda of Bossi’s party. 
 
 
4. THE ADVANTAGES OF AUTONOMY AND DEVOLUTION  
 
In the last twenty years, the opinions of the northern Italian population on federalism and 
devolution have changed, but attitudes are often ambivalent and partially contradictory. 
After the first electoral successes of the Lega Nord in the beginning of the nineties, the 
demand for more regional autonomy progressively spread among voters of all parties. In 
1991, a third of northern voters shared the claim for more regional autonomy. The 
adhesion to the request for tax autonomy was even higher and was supported by half of 
them (Biorcio, 1997:123). Above all traders, artisans and workers promoted this request 
that obtained less support among the upper classes. The proposal to recruit teachers 
regionally was backed by one out of four persons in northern Italy. This proposal was the 
main goal of the campaign of the Lega Nord against the “colonial school” and it obtained 
consensus in particular among electors of low cultural level. 
During the nineties, the general claim for more autonomy for the North increased, 
beyond the demands for autonomy for the single regions. It was a prospect the Lega had 
promoted since 1990 with the proposal of the division of Italy into three large macro-
regions. The claim for autonomy was not only shared by almost all the Lega voters, but it 
                                                 
4
 The data come from a Lapolis-Limes poll of February 2000.   
5
 Data were taken by different polls carried out by Demos, cf. Diamanti (2008). 
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gained plenty of support also among voters of other parties in the northern regions. The 
invention of Padania, that many people considered groundless, had significantly 
influenced public opinion (Albertazzi, 2006; Avanza, 2003). Only a small minority of 
voters declared themselves for the independence project, but nearly a third of the northern 
regions residents deemed this prospect advantageous (Diamanti, 1997). 
The secessionist project had provoked, as we have seen, strong oppositions, and 
therefore, in the end of the nineties, it was reduced to the more manageable form of 
devolution (Loiero, 2003). The claim for regional autonomy, in any case, had acquired 
relevance in the political agenda and in the public debate. The centre-left wing coalition 
tried to recover support in the northern regions by offering a partial answer to the 
problem. A proposal of reform of article V of the Constitution, that increased the powers 
of regions was presented and voted in Parliament. The Lega Nord opposed the reform 
considering it completely inadequate. Afterwards, the project was approved by the 
constitutional referendum of 7 October 2001. The participation to the vote, nevertheless, 
was very limited (34%): a clear mark of the weak capacity of mobilization of the reform 
proposed by the centre-left, but also of the loss of relevance of the problem. 
Still, the convergence of almost all parties on the prospect of federalist reforms 
had influenced the orientations of public opinion. The favourable opinion to a generic 
extension of regional autonomy had become almost unanimous mainly in northern Italy 
(see table 3). The request to delegate the management of taxation to the regions was more 
controversial: the proposal was supported by two thirds of northern regions residents, but 
nearly half of the residents of other regions residents opposed it (cf. also Gangemi, in this 
volume). 
 
TAB. 3.  Importance attributed to federal reform (2001) (%) 
 ALL GEOGRAFIC ZONE 
VOTE IN NORTHERN 
REGIONS DIFFERENCE 
   North Centre South Lega 
Centre-
right 
Centre-
left 
Other-
NR 
North-
South 
Lega-
Nord 
The Federal Reform of the State is a: 
very impor-
tant problem 26,2 29,4 17,5 26,8 66,0 33,4 21,0 28,5 2,6 36,6 
quite impor-
tant problem  33,4 36,5 31,1 30,7 23,4 41,1 36,5 32,5 5,8 -13,1 
secondary 
problem 28,7 25,2 35,1 29,6 8,4 19,4 34,6 24,7 -4,4 -16,8 
don’t know 11,7 8,9 16,4 12,8 2,2 6,1 7,9 14,3 -3,9 -6,7 
 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 0,0 0,0 
The Federal Reform of the State is the: 
First/second 
priority 0,9 1,5 0,6 0,3 10,4 1,8 0,6 0,8 1,2 8,9 
 
However, the issue of a federal reform of the state was not considered very 
important, especially if compared to other problems. In 2001 the federal reform was 
judged a very important matter by little more than a fourth of voters, without many 
differences between northern and southern residents (table 3). Anyway, this reform did 
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not represent one of the most important priorities: in northern Italy it was pointed out 
among the two most important problems to be dealt with only by 1,5 % of the 
interviewees. Support to federalism was of course much stronger within the electorate of 
the Lega Nord. But, only one voter in every ten pointed out the federal reform among the 
priorities. Other “problems” such as criminality, unemployment, immigrants and taxes 
often appeared as more relevant to the electorate of the Lega Nord.  
The general support of public opinion for an extension of powers and jurisdictions 
of the regions did not seem enough for the development of specific mobilizations. In 
order to put forward the proposals of a federalist reform, the Lega Nord employed above 
all its weight within the centre-right coalition after the elections of 2001 (Biorcio, 2003b). 
The realization of a constitutional federalist reform was set as an inalienable condition for 
the alliance with Berlusconi. Therefore, in 2005 a constitutional reform was presented in 
Parliament and approved by the parties of the Casa delle Libertà; it included a series of 
rules oriented to devolution, in particular the increase of powers of regions on subjects 
such as the school system, administrative police both regional and local, welfare and 
health administration. Still, in public opinion, the support to the project introducing a 
federalist reform was limited (see table 4). It was quite wider in the northern regions 
compared to the southern, especially in the small towns and among the self-employed 
workers. A strong support to the reform was expressed by the electorate of the Lega 
Nord, but it was less spread among that of the other centre-right parties and, above all, 
among the centre-left wing electorate (see table 4). 
In the elections of 2006, the coalition led by Berlusconi obtained almost half of 
the votes but, a few months later, the project of a constitutional reform was rejected by 
referendum by a large majority. The participation of citizens to the vote was higher than 
the previous referendum and it exceeded half of the electorate (52,3). But the defeat was 
very clear: the reform proposal got little more than a third of the valid votes (38,7 %), 
while a large majority had mobilized to reject it (61,3 %). Even within the northern 
regions the reform was rejected. Only in Lombardy and Veneto the electorate approved 
the introduction of devolution supported by the whole centre-right coalition. 
In order to restart the process of federal reform, the Lega Nord, back in power 
with Berlusconi in 2008, has tried to obtain political support even beyond the centre-right 
alliance. So, on 5 May 2009, a bill for the introduction of fiscal federalism was approved 
by the centre-right majority with the favourable vote of Italia dei Valori and the 
abstention of the PD. The proposal, however, did not receive a great support from public 
opinion. The expectation of positive effects is not much diffused (see table 4). Instead, 
many doubts and uncertainties remain among the great majority of citizens. They do not 
expect significant changes, fear negative effects or declare they do not have clear ideas on 
the matter. Within the southern regions the diffusion of expectations of negative effects is 
double compared to that of positive expectations. But, even in northern Italy, the 
expectations of positive effects are clearly a majority only among the Lega voters. 
Among those of other parties many people still do not have an opinion or do not expect 
any changes. 
The Lega Nord received much consent among that part of the electorate more 
interested in devolution and, in general, in reconsidering tax transfers to the state and to 
other regions. But it was unable to launch a larger movement on these matters, even if in 
northern Italy the opinions favourable to an enlargement of regional autonomy, above all 
related to the expectation of economic advantages, are really widespread. 
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TAB. 4. Assessments on Devolution and Fiscal Federalism (%) 
 ALL GEOGRAFIC ZONE 
VOTE IN NORTHERN 
REGIONS DIFFERENCE 
   North Centre South Lega 
Centre-
right 
Centre-
left 
Other-
NR 
North-
South 
Lega-
Nord 
Judgement on the reform introducing devolution 
Very 
favourable 15,6 22,4 10,5 9,7 70,5 37,7 12,0 12,7 12,7 48,1 
Quite  
favourable 32,0 35,6 35,8 25,3 25,9 46,7 32,5 30,5 10,3 -9,7 
Opposed 35,9 28,4 40,2 43,2 2,4 9,1 48,5 27,1 -14,8 -26,0 
Don’t know - 
no answer 16,5 13,7 13,6 21,8 1,3 6,5 7,0 29,8 -8,1 -12,4 
 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0   
Consequences of the Law on Fiscal Federalism for your region: 
Positive 31,8 44,5 28,4 14,5 62,4 42,1 23,7 21,2 30,0 17,9 
Negative 15,9 7,3 11,2 32,2 5,9 12,9 24,5 12,3 -24,9 -1,4 
Nothing will 
change 36,9 31,5 43,3 40,7 22,4 32,7 40,5 40,5 -9,2 -9,1 
Don’t know - 
no answer 15,5 16,7 17,0 12,7 9,3 12,3 11,3 26,0 4,0 -7,4 
 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0   
 
 
5. IMMIGRANTS AND THE SECURITY EMERGENCY 
 
In the elections of 2008, the votes for the Lega Nord almost doubled, returning to the 
level of 1992, and approaching the result of 1996. Once again, support increased above 
all among workers, confirming a trend not limited to northern Italy, but widespread all 
over Europe whereby populist formations often succeed in substituting left parties as the 
political representation of the popular electorate, and enlarge their support especially 
among workers (Biorcio, 2009). The Lega Nord was also very successful at the European 
elections in 2009 and in 2010 obtained the governors of the Veneto and Piedmont 
Regions. 
During the nineties, immigrants with residence permit doubled, passing from 
649.000 in the end of 1991 to 1.341.000 in 2000. The increase has continued and become 
more intense during the following decade. Even if the restrictions provided in the Bossi-
Fini law remain in force, the number of regular immigrants in the whole country tripled 
in a few years, passing, according to the Istat estimates, from 1.356.590 at the end of 
2001 to 4.330.000 in 2008 (see Figure 2). The number of immigrants over the population 
reached 6,5 % in 2008 and 7,2 % in 2009, clearly exceeding the European average.  
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The growth of immigration and its visibility were considered by many people as a 
menace since these phenomena were perceived as an invasion of social spaces and above 
all because, as a series of opinion polls revealed, public opinion since 2005 increasingly 
related them to concerns about the alleged increase of criminality. The mass perception of 
the increase of immigration is strongly marked by the way mass media treat the problem. 
The changes in behaviour of some actors (municipal councils, police, tribunals, security 
committees), the ideas diffused by mass media and the social alarm for the problems 
raised by the presence of non-European immigrants mutually reinforced changing 
perceptions on immigration. This situation created new opportunities for the initiatives of 
the Lega Nord, in building and managing a contentious relation between immigrants and 
Italians (cf. Sacchetto, in this volume). The Lega Nord succeeded in showing itself as the 
party most sensitive to the increasing claim for security that arises from the impact of 
globalization on social life. These problems were also perceived in the regions of Emilia 
and Liguria: territorial areas extraneous to the original areas of strength of the Lega Nord. 
We can say that the Lega Nord anticipated the other parties – even the left-wing 
parties – on the subject of the negative consequences that globalization causes within 
local communities (Cousin and Vitale, 2007). For many years, Bossi’s party had 
expressed itself in a very strong way against international and supranational institutions, 
such as the European Union and the WTO. Today, “local communities” effectively suffer 
from on-going economic and social processes and especially from the consequences of 
globalization. The Lega Nord provides an answer to these problems by focalizing 
hostility on immigrants and gipsies (Vitale and Claps, 2010), by promoting “patrols” to 
defend the local population, and by proposing duties and barriers to restrain international 
competition. 
Figure 2 - Immigrants in Italy 
0
500.000
1.000.000
1.500.000
2.000.000
2.500.000
3.000.000
3.500.000
4.000.000
4.500.000
5.000.000
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
N
u
m
b
e
r
 of
 Im
m
ig
ra
nts
 inItaly
 
Immigrants  
  
 
186 
In this way, in 2008, the Lega Nord managed to regain support and to reintroduce 
the battle for federalism by using changes in the social and political situation. The 
propaganda of the Lega Nord redefined the uneasiness and popular insecurity by 
establishing an explicative chain, at the same time causal, rational and metaphoric, to 
connect immigrants, unemployment, criminality, welfare crisis, taxes and future 
uncertainties. In this phase, Forza Italia and Alleanza Nazionale converged in a common 
party, accentuating their “cartelization”, with a proposal of individualized and mediatized 
political integration without participation and a reduction of the relations with interest 
groups, and hence separating and distancing themselves from the territory (Diamanti, 
2009:229). The strategy of the Lega Nord consisted in particular in insisting to build up, 
by every possible means and through a participative rootedness within the territories, a 
frame connected with the presumed negative practical consequences deriving from the 
presence of immigrants: increase of criminality, unemployment, social degradation of the 
most visible areas (as gardens and some public spaces), and diffusion of new infections. 
The hostility against immigrants served to guarantee a popular consensus around the 
Lega Nord, according to logics similar to those of other populist parties in Europe.  
Researches carried out between 1996 and 2008 show how the importance given to 
security and immigration problems in the northern regions is relatively higher than in the 
southern regions (see table 5). Still, the two problems remain at a lower level than 
employment, economic development and economic insecurity. Worries about the 
presence of immigrants are in most European countries more diffused among the less 
educated interviewees (see tables 6A and 6B). The electors of Lega Nord are 
distinguishable by all the others because they point out much more frequently worries 
about immigration and criminality. 
 
TAB. 5. Importance given to issues of immigration and criminality (1996-2008) (%) 
 ALL GEOGRAFIC ZONE 
VOTE IN NORTHERN 
REGIONS DIFFERENCE 
    North Centre South Lega 
Centre-
right 
Centre-
left 
Other-
NR 
North-
South 
Lega-
Nord 
1996 Proposed as the first two priorities 
Immigration 14,1 16,8 17,7 8,0 30,0 18,8 11,1 16,5 8,8 13,2 
2001 Proposed as the first two priorities 
Criminality 39,6 41,2 41,1 36,8 45,8 44,9 35,5 41,8 4,4 4,6 
Immigration of 
foreigners 11,5 16,5 10,0 5,8 26,1 18,7 15,3 13,7 10,7 9,6 
2006 Problems considered very important 
Criminality 72,6 71,3 76,7 72,0 77,0 74,4 64,8 74,9 -0,7 5,7 
Immigration 58,1 59,7 66,2 51,7 76,2 66,4 50,1 61,1 8,0 16,5 
2008 Problems spontaneously proposed as the most important 
Security, 
criminality, 
public order 13,3 15,7 14,5 9,5 25,5 24,0 8,9 14,0 6,2 9,8 
Immigration 4,9 6,9 3,3 3,3 9,2 11,1 2,0 7,8 3,6 2,3 
Sources: Itanes 1996, 2001, 2006, 2008 
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TAB. 6A. Most Prominent Perceived Social Problems in Italian Northern Regions by 
Educational Qualification (%) 
  ALL EDUCATIONAL QUALIFICATION 
LEGA 
VOTERS 
  
None/Primary 
school 
Junior High 
School 
High 
School University  
1996       
The First or the Second Priority: 
    
Immigration 16,8 19,0 19,1 12,8 8,7 30,0 
2001       
The First or the Second Priority: 
    
Crime 41,2 55,0 40,0 35,1 30,6 45,8 
Immigration 16,5 15,2 18,5 16,2 12,7 26,1 
2006       
Issues Considered "Very Important": 
    
Crime 71,3 75,6 76,7 68,7 48,8 77,0 
Immigration 59,7 54,3 65,4 59,9 48,2 76,2 
2008       
Problems Spontaneously Proposed as the Most Important: 
 
Security, Crime, Public 
Order 15,7 13,8 16,6 16,8 12,4 25,5 
Immigration 6,9 7,3 8,0 6,5 2,2 9,2 
 
TAB. 6B. Most Prominent Perceived Social Problems in Italian Northern Regions by 
Occupation (%) 
 ALL OCCUPATION 
LEGA 
VOTERS 
  Managers 
Emplo-
yees 
Self-
employed Workers Others 
Not Em-
ployed  
1996         
The First or the Second Priority: 
     
Immigration 16,8 14,1 11,5 12,3 16,8 25,7 15,9 30,0 
2001         
The First or the Second Priority: 
     
Crime 41,2 38,4 36,4 41,5 37,1 30,3 44,8 45,8 
Immigration 16,5 20,1 16,7 20,1 18,1 8,7 14,8 26,1 
2006         
Issues Considered "Very Important": 
     
Crime 71,3 65,2 64,2 73,3 70,8 63,0 75,6 77,0 
Immigration 59,7 54,2 57,5 62,1 63,9 53,7 60,2 76,2 
2008         
Problems Spontaneously Proposed as the Most Important: 
   
Security, Crime, 
Public Order 15,7 10,8 14,3 22,1 14,9 20,0 16,0 25,5 
Immigration 6,9 2,7 4,8 10,3 8,5 4,0 7,4 9,2 
Sources 6A and 6B: Itanes 1996, 2001, 2006, 2008 
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TAB. 7. Opinions on Immigrants and their Rights (2006 and 2008) (%) 
 ALL 
GEOGRAFIC 
ZONE 
VOTE IN NORTHERN 
REGIONS 
DIFFE-
RENCE 
    North Centre South Lega 
Centre-
right 
Centre-
left 
Other-
NR 
North-
South 
Lega-
Nord 
2006           
Immigrants are dangerous 
for our culture and identity 52,6 51,4 49,4 55,7 79,1 67,7 34,6 51,5 -4,3 27,7 
Immigrants are a threat to 
employment 50,1 44,2 46,8 59,7 66,1 57,9 31,4 42,8 -15,5 21,9 
It ought to be forbidden to 
gypsies to settle down in 
our town 78,8 78,0 81,7 78,1 91,5 88,1 69,9 76,0 -0,1 13,5 
Regular immigrants should 
have the right to vote in 
administrative elections in 
the town where they live 62,9 60,4 70,3 62,0 23,5 53,9 75,4 55,1 -1,6 -36,9 
It is right to permit to 
Muslims to built some 
Mosques in Italian Country 34,4 31,7 45,4 32,0 18,7 24,1 44,3 26,3 -0,3 -13,0 
2008 
          
Immigrants are dangerous 
for our culture 38,3 39,0 33,7 39,9 57,5 55,4 19,7 40,1 -0,9 18,5 
Immigrants are a threat for 
employment 41,6 38,2 36,3 49,0 52,1 50,6 16,9 43,8 -10,8 13,9 
It is right to permit to 
Muslims to built some 
Mosques in Italian Country 36,1 34,1 38,1 37,7 13,0 24,0 57,0 28,0 -3,6 -21,1 
Sources: Itanes 2006, 2008 
 
At the same time, it is very noteworthy to observe how hostile opinions against 
immigrants are relatively less diffused in the northern regions than in the southern (see 
table 7). These positions, on the other hand, are much more diffused even in the northern 
regions among the less educated interviewees and in general among workers, traders and 
self-employed persons (see table 8). The opinions of the Lega voters on these matters 
seem closer to the opinions present at a popular level in southern Italy. 
 As regards the massive increase of immigration and the perception of increasing 
criminality, developed also thanks to moral panic waves on mass media (Maneri, 2001; 
Palidda, 2009), the Lega Nord was perceived as the more coherent and combative 
political party, capable of criticizing even Berlusconi when he admitted the possibility to 
grant immigrants the right to vote for local elections (Cousin and Vitale, 2006). In the 
northern regions, the Lega Nord could appear as the party that – in the centre-right ambit 
– engaged itself more coherently and with more strength on such matters; this happened 
thanks to a higher attention to the territory, to relationships with people within local 
sections and to the role played by the network of elected mayors, in a phase in which 
parties became presidential in order to de-link themselves from the territory (Diamanti, 
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2009:11)6. The capacity of Lega Nord to obtain support is, as a matter of fact, to be 
understood not only considering the strategies engaged by the party leadership, but also 
looking at the actions engaged by the Lega political class within the territories (territorial 
branches, militants and administrators). One of the most noteworthy aspects of the Lega’s 
political action concerns, in fact, the coherence between the instances promoted by the 
party leadership and the priorities of administrative action of the Lega’s local political 
representatives (cf. among others Andall, 2009; Cento, Bull, 2009). The different changes 
of strategy of Lega Nord took place while keeping, in many localities of the North, a 
strong capacity to mobilize its grass roots activists, well rooted in their own territory, and 
able to translate instances and local problems into the language and priorities of the party 
(Biorcio, 2010). 
 
TAB. 8A. Opinions on Immigrants and their Rights (2006 and 2008) (%) 
  ALL EDUCATIONAL QUALIFICATION 
LEGA 
VOTERS 
  
None/ 
Primary 
school  
Junior 
High 
School 
High 
School 
Univer-
sity  
2006 
Immigrants are dangerous for our 
culture and identity 51,4 67,7 56,3 43,9 20,8 79,1 
Immigrants are a threat to 
employment 44,2 55,7 49,6 38,0 17,3 66,1 
It ought to be forbidden to gypsies 
to settle down in our town 78,0 86,3 78,2 74,0 73,6 91,5 
Regular immigrants should have the 
right to vote in administrative 
elections in the town where they live 60,4 61,3 56,9 60,9 71,4 23,5 
It is right to permit to Muslims to 
build Mosques in Italy 31,7 17,3 26,3 38,9 60,8 18,7 
2008 
Immigrants are dangerous for our 
culture 39,0 55,2 41,0 32,6 17,9 57,5 
Immigrants are a threat to 
employment 38,2 54,4 40,8 31,1 15,7 52,1 
It is right to permit to Muslims to 
build Mosques in Italy 34,1 18,3 31,6 40,6 56,4 13,0 
Sources: Itanes 2006, 2008 
 
                                                 
6
 It is therefore not surprising that Bossi readily worked to obstacle the so-called mayors 
movement that could constitute a transversal coalition of territorial political subjects, 
alternative to the political project of the Lega Nord (cf. Jori, 2009) 
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TAB. 8B. Opinions on Immigrants and their Rights (2006 and 2008) (%) 
 ALL OCCUPATION 
LEGA 
VOTERS 
  
Mana-
gers 
Emplo-
yee 
Self-em-
ployed 
Wor-
kers Others 
Not Em-
ployed  
2006      
Immigrants are 
dangerous for our 
culture and identity 51,4 32,8 40,4 56,3 51,1 44,0 57,8 79,1 
Immigrants are a 
threat to employment 44,2 26,3 33,2 46,0 52,2 47,8 47,8 66,1 
It ought to be forbid-
den to gypsies to 
settle down in our 
town 78,0 80,4 78,1 71,3 76,6 84,0 79,0 91,5 
Regular immigrants 
should have the right 
to vote in administra-
tive elections in the 
town where they live 60,4 55,1 61,4 51,7 54,8 76,0 63,3 23,5 
It is right to permit to 
Muslims to build 
Mosques in Italy 31,7 52,2 41,0 36,0 31,0 39,6 24,7 18,7 
2008    
Immigrants are 
dangerous for our 
culture 39,0 24,7 29,8 35,3 44,9 37,0 42,2 57,5 
Immigrants are a 
threat to employment 38,2 16,9 31,8 25,0 49,0 44,4 40,4 52,1 
It It is right to permit 
to Muslims to build 
Mosques in Italy 34,1 44,2 41,1 26,5 31,8 48,1 31,8 13,0 
Sources: Itanes 2006, 2008 
 
The Lega Nord is not characterized by a precise and fresh local government style, 
or by distinctive modalities of regulation, in particular modalities of contrasting 
particularism and patronage within the governance networks (policy network, networks 
of political interchange, structures of influence of the élites) from one side, and in the 
choices of allocation and distribution in public politics from the other. Nor is the party 
particularly innovative, in the ability of attracting resources from Europe or from 
enterprises, and concerning the presently most delicate challenges in northern Italy, 
relative to the multilevel articulation of decisional processes (Berta, 2008) and to the 
coordination between different cities in large areas, in a context of interurban competition 
(Perulli and Pichierri, 2010). 
If anything, the Lega Nord developed a political mobilization of its basis and top 
administrators able to select the priorities of public action by focusing on symbolic 
aspects that enable the party to obtain positive outcomes. These priorities, rather than 
matters of local development or competition between territories; concern issues of law 
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and order, proprieties, care of open spaces that, once being defined as priorities, allow to 
accumulate easy successes and to demonstrate a dynamic of incremental outcomes. 
 
 
6. THE PARADOXES OF THE LEGA'S “NORTH-ISM” 
 
The Lega Nord tried to offer to the northern regions a comprehensive political 
representation that was not limited to the defence of economic interests. And, sometimes, 
Bossi’s party managed to be acknowledged as an almost exclusive referent as regards the 
Northern Question. Can the Lega Nord be considered the radical expression of cultural 
trends spread in the North, different from those prevailing in the South? In order to 
answer this question, it is necessary to analyze value trends and political attitudes of 
citizens resident in the northern regions, by confronting them with those found in the 
southern regions. It will then be possible to display the specificities that the Lega’s 
electorate presents compared to trends and values of the northern regions. 
To deal with these problems, we used the techniques elaborated and proposed by 
the psychologist Shalom Schwartz who has researched peoples’ values in more than sixty 
countries of different continents.7 The analysis on the Italian value trends reveals some 
clearly differentiated tendencies between northern and southern regions, but also between 
Lega followers and those of other parties in northern Italy (see table 9). As regards some 
values such as security and conformism (respect for rules and respect for the conventions 
of “good manners”) the answers of the Lega voters seem to reinforce the differences 
between trends prevailing in the northern regions and those which characterize the 
southern regions. In this case, the Lega Nord voters stress the tendencies that more 
strongly characterize the North compared to the other parts of Italy. Lega voters, on the 
contrary, definitely differentiate from the trends prevailing in the northern regions for 
other values such as universalism and benevolence, much more spread among northern 
citizens than among southerners. Universalism synthesizes tolerance for different ideas 
and people, and the will to give everybody the same opportunities in life; benevolence 
shows the availability to respond to the others’ needs and to help people around us. It 
deals with values that, in general, are less shared by less educated people. We can further 
observe how among the Lega Nord electorate the value of traditionalism is very 
accentuated: a trend that does not present great differences between northern and 
southern regions, but it is much more shared by small provincial centres residents and, in 
general, by the less educated interviewees (see tables 10A and 10B). 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
7
 Schwartz identified ten types of basis values that people of all cultures recognize as 
more or less important targets of their life (Schwartz, 1992; 1994; 2006). His research 
concerns values that have been defined as universal both because acknowledged by 
people from very different cultures and societies, and because they are based on some 
fundamental human needs, such as that of controlling reality around us or establishing 
relationships with other people. 
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TAB. 9. Value-orientation (2006) (%) 
 ALL GEOGRAFIC ZONE 
VOTE IN NORTHERN 
REGIONS DIFFERENCE 
   All North Centre South Lega 
Centre-
right 
Centre-
left 
Other-
NR 
North-
South 
Lega-
Nord 
Security 69,8 72,1 77,9 63,7 83,3 75,6 69,9 65,5 8,4 11,2 
Conformism 51,9 53,3 59,3 47,1 70,0 57,5 50,8 43,9 6,2 16,7 
Tradition 38,3 38,0 44,6 35,8 45,8 45,6 32,0 34,3 2,2 7,8 
Self-
determination 43,4 47,5 47,7 37,2 47,4 49,4 48,4 41,7 10,3 -0,1 
Universalism 41,8 45,2 47,0 35,8 39,5 40,8 54,7 32,8 9,4 -5,7 
Benevolence 34,6 36,4 39,5 30,5 29,8 34,1 42,5 28,8 5,9 -6,6 
Source: Itanes 2006 
 
TAB. 10A Basis Values in Italian Northern Regions by Educational Qualification (%) 
  ALL EDUCATIONAL QUALIFICATION 
LEGA 
VOTERS 
  
None/Primary 
school  
Junior High 
School 
High 
School University  
Security 72,1 77,5 73,4 66,9 74,8 83,3 
Conformism 53,3 58,2 57,1 45,3 57,3 70,0 
Tradition 38,0 49,7 41,2 29,6 31,5 45,8 
Self-determination 47,5 40,5 44,6 50,3 63,7 47,4 
Universalism 45,2 32,3 42,6 50,0 64,3 39,5 
Benevolence 36,4 35,0 37,3 34,3 43,8 29,8 
Source: Itanes 2006 
 
TAB. 10B. Basis Values in Italian Northern Regions by Occupation (%) 
 ALL OCCUPATION 
LEGA 
VOTERS 
  Managers Employee 
Self-
Employed Workers Others 
Not 
Employed  
Security 72,1 72,0 70,7 73,6 69,8 68,7 73,3 83,3 
Conformism 53,3 64,3 46,8 55,7 49,3 41,4 56,3 70,0 
Tradition 38,0 40,6 29,4 43,6 36,6 42,0 40,5 45,8 
Self-
determination 47,5 58,7 50,4 61,4 46,7 52,3 42,5 47,4 
Universalism 45,2 62,9 52,6 41,3 41,2 49,8 41,2 39,5 
Benevolence 36,4 53,0 38,9 29,5 30,1 43,9 35,8 29,8 
Source: Itanes 2006 
 
Confirming these trends, researches carried out in 2006 and 2008 show other 
interesting aspects of the profile of the Lega’s electorate. We examine four areas of 
attitudes which are very important to orient political and social behaviours: interpersonal 
confidence, demand for authority, civil rights and neo-liberal economic politics. 
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Interpersonal confidence is considered one of the fundamental conditions for the 
development of the public spirit of a community (Putnam et al., 1993).8 More recent 
researches substantiate the historical difference as regards the level of interpersonal 
confidence, between northern and southern regions (Inglehart, 1993:35) (see table 11). It 
is interesting to notice that, concerning this attitude, Lega voters appear more similar to 
the inhabitants of the southern regions. The level of distrust towards the others that 
characterize the Lega voters can be found within the northern regions only among people 
of a very low cultural level (see table 12). 
 
TAB. 11. Opinions and Social Attitudes (2006 and 2008) (%) 
 ALL 
GEOGRAFIC 
ZONE 
VOTE IN NORTHERN 
REGIONS 
DIFFE-
RENCE 
    North Centre South Lega 
Centre-
right 
Centre-
left 
Other-
NR 
North-
South 
Lega-
Nord 
Interpersonal Trust 
           
You can trust most of the 
other people  17,8 20,3 19,2 13,8 13,7 18,8 30,6 15,2 6,5 -6,6 
You ought to be cautious in 
dealing with the people  79,3 76,6 77,6 83,6 84,2 79,3 64,7 82,1 -7,0 7,6 
Individual Rights 
           
Extend rights of married 
couples to couples who 
decide to have a stable 
relationship without marrying  66,1 70,6 70,0 58,0 65,8 56,8 88,1 66,2 12,6 -4,8 
Extend rights of married 
couples also to homosexual 
couples 34,3 39,5 38,4 25,2 28,8 28,0 61,4 32,2 14,3 -10,7 
Abortion has to be restricted  34,9 30,8 29,8 43,0 41,8 45,8 14,4 32,4 -12,2 11,0 
Demand of Authority 
           
Today in Italy we need a 
strong leader  75,7 74,7 74,3 77,8 93,2 90,0 56,7 75,4 -3,1 18,5 
Death penalty for worst 
crimes 42,2 39,1 37,0 49,0 56,1 50,8 24,2 42,9 -9,9 17,0 
Neo-Liberalism 
           
Enterprises ought to have 
more freedom to hire and fire 41,1 42,8 40,2 39,5 62,3 59,4 27,1 40,7 3,3 19,5 
Unions' power is too high 42,6 42,0 44,8 42,0 68,4 67,5 21,6 38,1 0,0 26,4 
Government ought to 
intervene less in economy  31,9 34,1 28,0 31,1 37,0 36,2 30,6 34,9 3,0 2,9 
Income divide between rich 
and poor has to decrease 79,0 76,8 84,6 78,7 59,7 70,1 81,0 80,9 -1,9 -17,1 
Sources: Itanes 2006, 2008 
 
                                                 
8
 The presence of public spirit is based on a set of conditions that refer both to structural 
aspects (relationships networks), and to cultural aspects (rules, social values and 
interpersonal confidence) that characterize a community (Putnam et al., 1993:196). The 
different aspects are related, and it is difficult to establish which one is prior to the others 
in causal terms, cf. Almond and Verba (1980). The point, all the same, is really delicate, 
with important political repercussions, as is argued, among others, by Sabetti (2002: ch. 
9) and Huysseune (2002).  
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TAB. 12A. Opinions and Social Attitudes in Italian Northern Regions by Educational 
Qualification (2006) (%) 
  ALL EDUCATIONAL QUALIFICATION 
LEGA 
VOTERS 
  
None/ 
Primary 
school  
Junior 
High 
School 
High 
School 
Univer-
sity  
Interpersonal Trust 
     
 
You can trust most of the other people  20,3 14,1 17,4 24,9 32,9 13,7 
You ought to be cautious in dealing 
with the people  76,6 83,4 79,4 72,9 61,4 84,2 
Individual Rights 
      
Extend rights of married couples to 
couples who decide to have a stable 
relationship without marrying  70,6 61,8 72,0 72,3 75,7 65,8 
Extend rights of married couples also 
to homosexual couples 39,5 14,5 43,5 42,6 57,1 28,8 
Abortion has to be restricted  30,8 44,4 29,6 26,0 25,0 41,8 
Demand of Authority 
      
Today in Italy we need a strong leader  74,7 78,8 77,7 72,6 59,3 93,2 
Death penalty for worst crimes 39,1 51,2 41,9 34,3 17,3 56,1 
Neo-Liberalism 
     
 
Enterprises ought to have more 
freedom to hire and fire 42,8 36,9 44,4 44,3 41,4 62,3 
Unions' power is too high 42,0 42,4 40,0 44,2 41,8 68,4 
Government ought to intervene less in 
economy  34,1 28,2 34,3 37,4 35,0 37,0 
Income divide between rich and poor 
has to decrease 76,8 81,4 80,3 73,8 62,5 59,7 
Sources: Itanes 2006, 2008 
 
A similar outline characterizes opinions on individual civil rights. In the northern 
regions there is a more open attitude towards these matters compared with the southern: a 
greater disposition in favour of laws that recognize rights to common-law and 
homosexual couples; a lesser availability towards more restrictive measures for abortion. 
On these problems, the positions of Lega voters tend to be similar to those expressed by 
residents of the southern regions and, above all, correspond to the opinions of older and 
less educated people. 
We can also find similar differences in the quest for authority, which is usually 
related to a demand for more severity in punishment. These opinions are less diffused 
within the northern regions than within the southern. In the northern regions, in fact, the 
idea of death penalty for the most serious crimes and the claim for authority expressed 
with the demand for a “strong leader” are definitely less spread. On these matters, the 
trend of Lega voters comes closer (accentuating them) to the most widespread position of 
southern Italy and reflects, once more, the prevailing opinions within the less educated 
popular sectors. 
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TAB. 12B. Opinions and Social Attitudes in Italian Northern Regions by Occupation (2006) 
(%) 
 ALL OCCUPATION 
LEGA 
VOTERS 
  
Mana-
gers 
Emplo-
yee 
Self-em-
ployed 
Wor-
kers Others 
Not Em-
ployed  
Interpersonal Trust 
        
You can trust most of 
the other people  20,3 23,4 23,3 16,2 16,7 18,5 20,4 13,7 
You ought to be 
cautious in dealing 
with the people  76,6 70,1 73,6 77,9 80,3 81,5 77,0 84,2 
Individual Rights 
        
Extend rights of 
married couples to 
couples who decide 
to have a stable 
relationship without 
marrying  70,6 76,6 75,6 75,0 77,8 77,8 66,1 65,8 
Extend rights of 
married couples also 
to homosexual 
couples 39,5 46,8 54,3 48,5 48,5 51,9 30,3 28,8 
Abortion has to be 
restricted  30,8 20,8 21,7 22,1 28,3 29,6 36,2 41,8 
Demand of 
Authority 
        
Today in Italy we 
need a strong leader  74,7 66,2 74,4 75,0 80,8 85,2 73,3 93,2 
Death penalty for 
worst crimes 39,1 29,9 28,3 47,3 50,9 44,3 39,4 56,1 
Neo-Liberalism 
        
Enterprises ought to 
have more freedom to 
hire and fire 42,8 59,7 35,7 61,8 39,4 59,3 41,8 62,3 
Unions' power is too 
high 42,0 58,9 36,4 63,8 38,2 23,7 40,9 68,4 
Government ought to 
intervene less in 
economy  34,1 37,7 33,7 45,6 35,4 29,6 32,2 37,0 
Income divide 
between rich and 
poor has to decrease 76,8 65,4 72,4 74,3 81,0 56,1 79,7 59,7 
Sources: Itanes 2006, 2008 
 
We can, finally, observe how the Lega Nord voters are characterized by a strong 
support for economic liberalism. Within the northern regions Lega voters differentiate 
themselves by a much stronger support to claims for reducing the power of unions and to 
extend the enterprises’ freedom of dismissal. The support to policies directed towards the 
reduction of social disparities is much more limited compared to the rest of the electorate. 
The Lega Nord intended to create a party which represented the whole of the 
northern regions, capable to defend their interests and culture. If we examine the profile 
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of people that voted for the Lega Nord, we find some discordant features compared to the 
project. A large majority of the party’s electorate naturally supports federalism and 
devolution. However, the party’s electorate paradoxically displays value trends and 
convictions that, for many aspects are in countertendency compared to the population of 
northern Italy, and much closer to those of the southern electorate. 
The relationship between the Lega Nord and northern society remains ambivalent 
and the party is unable to represent the whole of value instances that its citizens consider 
most important. Bossi’s party gave only partly expression to the dominant ideas and 
values in northern Italy. This would seem a quite strange paradox for a regionalist party 
born to draw attention to the Northern Question. This paradox is all interior to political 
dynamics, where actors interact in a complex way, considering the context in which they 
are included, that binds them, but does not determine them: far from being the expression 
of a homogeneous territory as regards culture and values, the Lega Nord is a particular 
political actor that builds its own identity by selecting themes and questions to represent.  
On the other hand, the North presents some very noteworthy interior differences 
both in territorial and socio-cultural terms; even if in the last years some converging 
dynamics are emerging around the medium enterprise model with long networks 
(Bagnasco, 2009; Perulli and Pichierri, 2010). As Michel Huysseune reminds in the 
beginning of this volume, centrifugal regionalism reveals deep conflicts not only between 
territories, but also and above all, within the same regional territory, of the same 
“regional culture”, showing this way the value heterogeneity internal to every territory. 
The Lega was able to intercept and mobilize a specific type of electorate – present above 
all in particular territorial contexts and within the popular and less educated sectors of the 
population – that on the point of view of values, of public spirit and of social attitudes, is 
distinguishable from the prevailing trends within the northern population and resembles 
the most diffused ones in the South. The Lega Nord was able to obtain support especially 
in these areas, by reinforcing fears, prejudices and some specific value trends of its 
inhabitants. By acting in such way, however, it progressively mobilized around a number 
of political matters quite distinctive from the territorial ones, engaging itself rather in the 
defence of identity and national frontiers. 
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